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Abstract
Background: Innovation theory has focused on the adoption of new products or services by individuals and their
market-driven diffusion to the population at large. However, major health sector innovations typically emerge from
negotiations between diverse stakeholders who compete to impose or at least prioritise their preferred version of
that innovation. Thus, while many digital health interventions have succeeded in terms of adoption by a substantial
number of providers and patients, they have generally failed to gain the level of acceptance required for their integration
into national health systems that would promote sustainability and population-wide application. The area of innovation
considered here relates to a growing number of success stories that have created considerable enthusiasm among donors,
international agencies, and governments for the potential role of ICTs in transforming weak national health information
systems in middle and low income countries. This article uses a case study approach to consider the assumptions,
institutional as well as technical, underlying this enthusiasm and explores possible ways in which outcomes
might be improved.
Methods: Literature review and case study analysis.
Results: The two systems considered have had considerable success in terms of gaining and maintaining government
support and addressing the concerns of providers without compromising their core elements. In Uganda, the system
has flourished in spite of severe resource constraints, using a participatory approach that has encouraged a
high level of community engagement. In China, concern with past failures generated the political will to build
a high quality surveillance system, using the latest technology and drawing on a highly skilled human resource base.
Conclusions: Both example stress the importance of recognising the political, social and historical context within which
information systems have to function. Implementers need to focus as much on the perceptions, attitudes and needs of
stakeholders as on the technology. Implementers should distinguish between factors which may influence engagement
at an institutional level and those aimed at supporting and supervising individuals within those institutions. Finally, we
would suggest that designing interoperability into systems at the outset, rather than assuming that this can be achieved
at some point in the future, may prove far easier in the longer term.
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Introduction
There is a voluminous literature on a multiplicity of
digital health innovations in middle and low income
countries and in recent years a growing number of
evaluation studies that have demonstrated beneficial im-
pacts from these interventions. However, it remains the
case that the great majority have been limited in scale
and undertaken in stand-alone, vertical project mode.
The term ‘pilotitis’ has been used to express the frustra-
tion of many of those in the health sector at the continu-
ing emphasis on demonstrating successful outcomes
from narrowly focused interventions targeting relatively
small populations. The clearest example of such frustra-
tion was provided by the actions of the government of
Uganda which initiated a moratorium in 2012 [1], de-
manding that future interventions prioritised intero-
perability, sustainability and conformity to existing MoH
cyber laws and data requirements. In addition, success
has often been described from a technical, rather than
health outcomes, perspective and costs understated, for
example when implementing agencies fail to include
pro-bono support provided by their staff members,
equipment donations from manufacturers or cost sub-
sidies by telecoms companies.
The aim of this paper is explore the potential for new in-
formation and communications technologies (ICTs) to
transform national health information systems [2]. While
there are a number of initiatives underway in this area, it
appears to have attracted limited attention in the literature,
where discussion is typically limited to technical rather
than health systems issues. The paper addresses this ob-
jective using case studies of interventions in two countries,
China and Uganda, that have designed and implemented
ICT-based national reporting systems. We regard the com-
parison between these examples as of particular interest in
that, while both countries have enthusiastically embraced
these technologies over recent years, they differ radically in
terms of (a) the level of resources which they have been
able to dedicate to health information systems and (b) the
nature of their healthcare systems.
China is a transition economy that has experienced
long-term rapid growth, allowing the allocation of
ample financial and human resources to the develop-
ment of a new information system which has also
benefited from strong political support. However, pub-
lic health facilities in China have a large degree of au-
tonomy, depend mainly on payments either by patients
or insurance agencies and operate under “an archaic
and complex governance structure” (p835) [3], often
resulting in what might be seen as a ‘management by
exception’ regime, in which responsible authorities will
typically only intervene if it becomes apparent that a
hospital is failing to meet service provision or financial
obligations. Reforms, including those relating to information
systems, will typically be introduced by a process of nego-
tiation, not imposition.
The health system in Uganda has a history of innovation
in the use of ICT, supported by multiple international
donors, but very limited resources even for the provision
of basic services. One potential advantage in terms of in-
formation systems coverage is that, as set out in the Health
Sector Strategic Plan [4], the Ministry of Health (MoH)
views both the public sector, where staff are salaried
government employees and treatment is, at least in theory,
free of change, and the not-for-profit (NFP) sector, which
is a major provider in poorer rural areas, as components of
an integrated system. District Health Teams are held re-
sponsible for the overall performance of services in their
district, to the extent that the MoH produces a ‘district
league table’ [5] using an HMIS database which is based on
a unified reporting system for public and NFP sectors [6, 7].
Literature overview
There is a long history of failing or at least deficient health
information systems in many countries [8], not only in
terms of information relating to the management of ser-
vices but also that on specific population health concerns
and general health status. While there have been multiple
attempts by both government and international agencies to
improve routine data systems in the health sector, there is
still a heavy reliance on surveys (for example the Demo-
graphic and Health Surveys) or vertical program data sys-
tems (for example on AIDS, TB or malaria) when timely,
high quality data is required. The recent outbreaks of Ebola
and Zika have again highlighted the enormous potential
value of reliable, timely surveillance data and the risks asso-
ciated with its absence [9]. A number of UN agencies
(UNICEF, WHO), international donors (DFID, USAID, the
World Bank) and agencies (IHME, JHU-GmI, MEASURE
Evaluation, PARIS 21) now appear to be convinced that re-
cent developments in ICTs will provide the means to trans-
form health information systems and at last provide policy
makers with the data they need to make informed decisions
in the health sector that reach the least advantaged.
The starting point for this article is a concern that this
enthusiasm is often based on optimistic assumptions
about the innovation process (essentially that ‘good’ inno-
vations will inevitably flourish), while the need is to iden-
tify specific health systems challenges and assess the
extent to which ICTs might play a role in addressing these.
Too often the focus is limited to defining an appropriate
technical package – reporting formats, equipment, soft-
ware, training, etc. – which long experience in OECD
countries suggests is a necessary but by no means suffi-
cient requirement [10]. Failure may just as easily result
from institutional or social constraints, and stakeholder
analysis may be as important as traditional information
systems analysis [11, 12].
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There is also a common assumption, again contrary to
experience relating to both public and private sector or-
ganisations in highly development economies, that only
the documented, formal information system need be
considered. In practice this often has limited relevance
for the effective information system, which can only be
understood by detailed observation and analysis (‘Soft
Systems Analysis’ [13] is commonly used in the private
sector for this purpose). There seems a serious risk that
rather than reforming health information systems in
ways that encourage improved policy making and hence
better health outcomes, ICT innovations may improve
some technical aspects of data availability, timeliness or
quality, while failing to address inherent weaknesses in
the overall system whereby information feeds into the
policy making process [14].
A more nuanced understanding of the innovation
process relevant to health information systems may en-
hance the prospects for success. The Oxford English Dic-
tionary defines an ‘innovation’ as a “new method, idea,
product, etc.”, devised by one or more ‘experts’ which im-
pacts on a given population when adopted by some mem-
bers of that population. Röling [15] suggests that this view
of the innovation process has remained extremely influen-
tial, partly because the experts concerned find it very at-
tractive. Much of the early work on innovations [16]
focused on innovation diffusion from those early adopters
to the population at large. Given that much of this work
derived from the field of marketing and economics, it is
not surprising that the focus was on the role of competi-
tion as a driver of diffusion, with successful innovations
emerging as a consequence of the rational decisions of
millions of individual actors.
On the other hand, health innovations often emerge as
a result of a series of complex interactions involving
multiple actors including scientists, providers, clients,
competitors, regulators and various other private and
public organizations [17]. Decisions to adopt are typic-
ally made not by isolated individuals but by groups and
organisations whose members may have very different
perceptions as to the potential costs and benefits of any
given innovation. In some cases, as in the examples con-
sidered here, innovations may be initially imposed by a
policy directive from a government ministry.
In a wide ranging review, Länsisalmi et al. [18] makes
the case that such top-down health service innovations
can be seen as especially complex and problematic. They
point to substantial evidence as to the difficulties of
changing the attitudes and practices of healthcare
workers, who may perceive that there are risks associ-
ated with an innovation, perhaps including that of ad-
versely affecting health outcomes, with potentially
serious ethical, professional, social and/or financial im-
plications. Providers, particularly those with high level
qualifications and/or many years of experience, typically
place a high value on their autonomy and reputation,
and may resist innovative practices [19]. They may be
particularly unconvinced as to the benefits of innova-
tions, such as information systems, that are outside their
area of expertise.
Evidence from a review of eHealth innovations [12] indi-
cates that centralised diffusion systems such as those con-
sidered here were more effective in disseminating
authoritative evidence and preserving the ‘fidelity’ [20] of
interventions, but less successful in terms of adopter
engagement, partly because of strict limits on the extent to
which implementation could be modified to address the
concerns of specific organisations or stakeholders. Even in-
novations apparently involving purely technical changes,
such as the introduction of a new health information
system, may have complex socio-political implications in
terms of changes in logistics, working practices, organisa-
tional arrangements and institutional requirements. Retain-
ing implementation fidelity will often involve a battle of
wills, with implementers resisting demands for the intro-
duction of variations in innovation components in line with
local circumstances and actors.
This entails a recognition that often “use and develop-
ment are twin processes and that they unfold in real
time, mutually shaping each other as learning by using
expands or narrows the technology’s scope of applica-
tion” (p302) [21]. Greenhalgh and Russell [12], argue
that so-called ‘evidence based’ health sector innovations
are typically subjected to a convoluted series of negotia-
tions between stakeholders which serve to mediate
often highly contested understandings and perceptions.
Consoli and Mina [21] suggest that innovations imple-
mented to solve a given problem will typically result in
a series of new problems necessitating appropriate ad-
aptations. Implementation can thus be viewed as “tra-
jectories of problems and solutions” (p309).
Kiwanuka et al. [22], in a study of the District Health
Information System in Uganda, which will be discussed
further below, emphasises the need to distinguish clearly
between the ‘adoption’ of such an innovation by health
providers – hard to resist when that innovation is intro-
duced by government – and its ‘acceptance’ by those
providers [23]. Following Kollmann [24], they discuss
the ‘acceptance process’ which can be seen as a dynamic,
often non-linear, progression from initial perceptions of
and attitudes to a top-down intervention, through its,
possibly reluctant, adoption to its acceptance, if all goes
as planned, as a routine activity. This suggests that adop-
tion can be seen as simply the first and perhaps least
problematic phase in the drive towards the integration
of an innovation into the health system. The greater risk
is that of ‘sustainability failure’ [25, 26], where projects
either fail completely after a period of apparent success
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or gradually diverge so far from their original intentions,
with increasing ‘design-actuality gaps’ [26], that many of
their intended beneficial outcomes are sacrificed. The
case studies discussed below may be instructive in that
they appear to have avoided, at least to a considerable
degree, these twin pitfalls.
The China case study
The outbreak in late 2002 of what came to be known as
severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) revealed ser-
ious limitations in China’s disease surveillance system.
For example, provincial governments had to obtain au-
thorisation from the Ministry of Health (MoH) before
announcing an epidemic and the list of mandatory re-
portable infectious diseases was very narrowly defined,
such that local governments were not required by law to
report cases of what was diagnosed as atypical pneumo-
nia. As fear of SARS disrupted all aspects of life in
China, the impact of the disease rapidly transformed
from a major public health concern to a serious social
and economic crisis [27]. It elicited a dramatic response
from government, including a massive mobilisation of
health providers and the establishment of a US$1 billion
fund to support SARS prevention and control, which
rapidly bought the epidemic to an end by August 2003.
As one component of a major series of reforms initi-
ated in response to failures in addressing the SARS out-
break, the government established the Infectious Disease
Reporting Information Management System (IDRIMS).
Managed by the Centre for Disease Control and Preven-
tion, this is the world’s largest web-based, real-time sur-
veillance system and is intended to provide a common
platform that will enable all health facilities in the coun-
try to provide information on 37 notifiable diseases
within 24 h of diagnosis [28, 29]. It involved an invest-
ment of some US$100 million in hardware, software,
programmer salaries and staff training [30]. By standar-
dising epidemic disease surveillance across all health
institutions, it is claimed to have improved data timeli-
ness, completeness and validity. Average reporting time
is said to have decreased by a factor of 10, the number
of complete reports increased by 33% and the number of
missing reports substantially reduced. By the end of
2010, it was being used in 68,000 facilities, 97% of
county and above hospitals and over 82% of township
level clinics, and receiving around 25,000 reports per
day [31]. Wang et al. [28] suggest that the new system,
and the reform of the mandatory reporting laws, have
substantially changed the attitudes of providers: “Before
this, health-care providers and hospitals did not take
disease reporting seriously” (p1603).
IDRIMS can be viewed as a centrally managed rela-
tional database with direct links via a virtual private
network (VPN) to healthcare providers, disease control
and prevention agencies and health administration
departments at all levels from township upwards. It was
intended to bypass the previous hierarchical flow of infor-
mation in which facilities would submit individual case
reports to a local CDC, which would then prepare
monthly summaries for analysis at the national level. It is
linked to geographical information system software, which
provides a real-time display, allowing users to identify case
clusters in a given location which may indicate an out-
break of one of the monitored infectious diseases. By pro-
viding case-based as opposed to aggregated data, health
officials can immediately analyse the characteristics (e.g.
location, age, sex, occupation) of those suffering in that
outbreak and, because the data reflects the situation
within the previous 24 h, develop timely and appropriate
plans for containment and treatment [28, 32].
The perceived success of the IDRIMS has led to the de-
velopment of a number of disease-specific reporting initia-
tives extending the core database. These include Malaria
[33, 34], Dengue [35], and Tuberculosis [36, 37]. In the
case of Malaria, healthcare providers are encouraged to
report both confirmed and suspected cases to the local
CDC for rapid follow-up. This can be done using a mobile
phone short message service (SMS) system, which was
integrated into the IDRIMS following the Sichuan earth-
quake of 2008, when severe damage to both health facil-
ities and communications infrastructure made their
internet connection inoperable [38]. Detection of dengue
outbreaks has made use of the Infectious Disease
Automated-alert and Response System (IDARS) imple-
mented in 2008, which conducts routine analysis of
IDRIMS data using three anomaly detection methods to
alert health officials to atypical disease patterns at county
level, comparing each current seven day period to the
corresponding period, and the preceding and following
two week periods. The identification of an anomaly would
result in a review of the data by an epidemiologist and a
potential field visit to the site of suspected outbreak. CDCs
at the county, prefecture, provincial and national levels
participate in the system [35].
Perhaps the most sophisticated addition has been the
TB Information Management System (TBIMS), which
builds on IDRIMS data to track TB care from suspected
cases to outcomes and includes substantial additional in-
formation relating to testing and treatment. An initial
version was implemented in 2005 and substantially re-
vised in 2009, with a drug-resistant TB module imple-
mented in 2011 [37]. The system is used by all (around
3200) health facilities focusing on TB including TB dis-
pensaries and designated hospitals at county, prefecture
and provincial levels [36]. These facilities report con-
firmed cases to the TBIMS within 48 h and presumptive
cases to the IDRIMS within 24 h. Other hospitals will
refer patients seeking TB care to a TB dispensary or
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designated hospital and report the case to the IDRIMS.
The referral unit will automatically receive notification
of the case and can check if the patient did seek care, if
the diagnosis was confirmed and if a positive diagnosis
led to an entry in the TBIMS. Over the three years fol-
lowing introduction of the new system, the number of
referred patients obtaining a diagnosis increased by
more than 150%, “mainly due to improved tracing of
referred patients” [37] (p939}. Around one million cases/
suspects are entered into the system each year. A paral-
lel paper-based system was run from 2005 to 2008 to
assess the reliability of the new approach and implement
data entry validation procedures which are said to have
substantially reduced reporting errors [36]. Until the im-
plementation of the new reporting system, the detection
rate in China was only around 30% and multi-drug re-
sistance was becoming an ever more serious concern. In
2005, the detection rate increased to an estimated 80%
of cases [37] and by 2011 it had reached 90% [39].
Challenges
As with almost all ICT innovations in the health sector,
a familiar list of problems have been encountered by
those implementing the IDRIMS. Facilities in remote
areas may lack adequate computer facilities, for example
being dependent on a single device, or internet services
which are slow or unreliable. In 2007 it was estimated
that around 5% of county and 29% of township facilities
had to submit reports over the telephone to another in-
stitution with internet access [30], obviously increasing
the risk of data entry errors. In spite of the investment
in training, it was often difficult in some locations to
find sufficient staff who were able to enter data reliably
and efficiently. This gave rise to complaints about having
to take on what was seen as the burden of long hours of
data entry [31, 32]. In Jiangsu Province workers were
given an incentive for each case of malaria reported to
compensate for what was seen as an additional work-
load. This was reported to have led to a considerable in-
crease in data quality [33]. Finally, the need for system
maintenance and updating, given the enormous volume
of data entered each day, requires a substantial team of
programmers, computer operators and advisory staff
with medical knowledge to address inevitable software
errors and hardware malfunctions [31].
More generally, IDRIMS has another limitation that is
very common in the area of digital health, usually de-
scribed as a lack of interoperability [40]. The need, follo-
wing the limitations exposed by the SARS outbreak, to
undertake rapid reform of disease surveillance procedures
could only be accomplished by creating a stand-alone ver-
tical system. Comparison might be made to the long
standing debate on the merits of horizontal versus vertical
healthcare programs [41]. Under IDRIMS, hospitals are
provided with standardised software by the CDC and
instructed to designate a staff member to operate the sys-
tem and enter reports. A doctor responsible for the pa-
tient with a notifiable disease is required to pass the
IDRIMS data items, as specified in laws on the Prevention
and Treatment of Infectious Diseases, to that individual.
The same doctor must also provide the same data items
and more to the Hospital Information System (HIS).
Because hospitals in China have a considerable degree
of autonomy, they design or select HIS software entirely
in line with what they see as their specific needs, greatly
limiting the possibility for sharing information with other
providers or public health agencies. “Very few people en-
gaging in HIS have recognized its potential usefulness in
providing key information for public health in China, and
the uses of HIS are limited to the administration of hospi-
tals and their patients” (p632) [32]. Similar issue arise with
the TBIMS. This is fully interoperable with IDRIMS but
not with the information systems used by the TB desig-
nated hospitals. Again, information must be entered sep-
arately into each system [36]. These limitations result not
only in the inefficient use of staff time and delays in the
reporting of information, but almost certainly lead to a
loss in data quality and a lack of compatibility between
different sources of information that can hamper the ana-
lysis and interpretation of health data.
The IDRIMS was established as a vertical project, driven
by the political imperative to respond to the SARS crisis
with a rapid and radical reform of the disease surveillance
system. Prolonged negotiations on the design of an inter-
operable reporting system with facilities that had adopted
a wide variety of individually designed information man-
agement systems was not a feasible option. However,
twelve years after the initial intervention, there is a recog-
nition that the need for interoperability remains, not only
in terms of practical issues relating to potential improve-
ments in data quality and timeliness, but also to allow the
compilation of comprehensive patient-centred informa-
tion on diagnosis, treatment and outcomes.
Central to this issue is the fact that there is no real in-
centive to generate information that might be extremely
useful to those concerned with health policy or planning,
but has no obvious relevance for the operational activ-
ities of a specific facility. One interesting example relates
to the use of record identifiers. Each Chinese citizen is
in possession of a Resident Identity Card (RIC), which
includes a unique identification number. This number
will be included on an individual’s IDRIMS entry which,
in theory, should allow it to be linked to their facility
medical records. However, while these records will typic-
ally include a field intended to capture the RIC number,
in many cases it will not be completed because the fa-
cility has organised its data around an alternative, in-
ternal, reference code.
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The hierarchical nature of the system is especially
problematic in a country where healthcare is based on
place of residence and where there is an internal migrant
population of over 200 million. In the case of commu-
nicable diseases such as TB, which require an extended
period of treatment, it is essential that patients who
move from one locality to another can be easily traced
and the process from diagnosis to treatment and out-
come recorded. However, the data entered at county
level by a TB dispensary or designated hospital is cur-
rently accessible only at higher levels, not to the cor-
responding facilities in other counties [36].
Another inevitable implication of establishing a sur-
veillance system that focuses on a legally determined list
of notifiable diseases, 37 in the case of IDRIMS, is that it
may omit some important conditions. For example,
extra-pulmonary TB, because of the low – but not negli-
gible – risk of transmission, is not on the list, even in
cases where it proves to be drug resistant. A more gen-
eral problem is that any such surveillance system which
is based to a very large extent on formally diagnosed
case reports will almost certainly miss cases which arise
in poorer rural areas. Many hospitals and clinics in these
areas may lack the equipment and laboratory facilities to
undertake robust diagnosis of some conditions, and vil-
lage doctors, typically the first point of contact for pa-
tients, often lack training in the identification and
diagnosis of some infectious diseases. This is a particu-
larly important concern for diseases which have a higher
incidence among those with poorer living conditions or
unhealthy environments. There have been a number of
recent proposals to establish an integrated surveillance
system, using a ‘syndromic surveillance’ approach to
complement traditional case report surveillance in rural
China [42, 43].
The Uganda case study
The mTrac component of eHMIS [44] was first piloted by
the Foundation for Innovative New Diagnostics [45] in
2009/2010 in two Districts. In 2011, DFID approached the
MoH, WHO and UNICEF with a highly ambitious pro-
posal to scale the system nationally within one year.
mTrac’s initial purpose at that time was to allow health fa-
cility staff to use their mobile phones to send weekly
HMIS surveillance reports via SMS which included data
on notifiable diseases, malaria treatment and stock levels
of antimalarials to the District Local Government and the
MoH. It also provided a toll-free ‘anonymous health
service delivery’ hotline number which could be used by
anyone to report via toll-free SMS messages on any health
issue, including health worker absenteeism, fraud, extor-
tion, assault and theft of medicines [45, 46]. The under-
lying technology was based on RapidSMS, an open source
web framework developed by the UNICEF Innovation
Unit, which provides a tool for rapidly developing and
deploying SMS based systems at scale [47].
With the mHealth moratorium in place, mTrac was
one of only a handful of initiatives approved by the
MoH to scale-up. It was initiated in some 1000 facilities
in 28 districts by March 2012 and by March 2013 was
scaled up to every government health facilities in all
112 districts. By June 2015, mTrac had been extended
to include most non-government and private health fa-
cilities, totalling approximately 4400. Investments in
creating an enabling environment – including updating
national policies, capacity building, software develop-
ment, provision of computers and modems to districts,
establishment of the hotline and staff training required
an initial investment, mainly by international donors, of
some US$4.5 million. The MoH has assumed responsi-
bility for some of the comparatively limited recurrent
costs, primarily relating to internet connections and
maintaining the software, though not the cost of the
SMS service [48].
Each week, facility health workers use their own mo-
bile phones to submit short SMS messages, each of
which starts with a keyword relating to a distinct elem-
ent of the standard HMIS form 033b [49] (p551). These
messages are received at the MoH Resource Centre in
Kampala and feed automatically into a central web-
based database, where District Health staff can imme-
diately access the data online for review, verification
and, where necessary, correction by the relevant District
Health Team (DHT) and selected national stakeholders.
Once validated, the data is automatically fed into the
District Health Information System (DHIS2), the central
database used for the analysis of national level health
services data, where both aggregated and disaggregated
data can be analysed using pivot tables, graphs and a
Geographical Information System (GIS). Summary re-
ports are sent by the MoH Resource Centre to key ac-
tion centres, including the Epidemiology Surveillance
Division, the Pharmacy Division, the National Malaria
Control Programme and collaborating health develop-
ment partners [50].
The mTrac system also initiates real-time SMS ‘alerts’
to warn district and national stakeholders when certain
actionable data is reported, such as cases of viral haem-
orrhagic fever and cholera, to provoke immediate and
appropriate interventions. Similar procedures were ini-
tially introduced for the community-based volunteers
who constitute the village health teams (VHTs). They
also submitted weekly data, in this case from MoH form
097, the VHT register [49] (p509), including stocks of
ACT and Amoxycillin [44]. However, the national medi-
cine supply chain was unable to react and respond to in-
creasing cases of stock-outs at the community level, and
this component of mTrac was temporarily put on hold.
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mTrac is the primary source of weekly HMIS data for
the DHIS2. District biostatisticians analyse the data col-
lected through mTrac using DHIS2 to review trends in fa-
cility reporting performance, disease incidence rates and
drug stock levels. Analysis at the national level is under-
taken by the MoH Resource Centre in collaboration with
other divisions and agencies. Following the introduction
of mTrac, stock-outs of ACTs decreased from 25% to 14%
over an 18-month period [51]. Reporting rates for the
surveillance form 033b, which were around 50% in the
first week of 2015, reached 68% by December 2015, the
highest proportion for the public sector since the form
was introduced. In addition, data was gathered from over
2000 non-government health facilities [52].
A designated team of officials at the MoH, who review
each message and pass it to the appropriate agency, ini-
tially handles the widely publicised toll-free hotline
phone number. About 90% of reports are sent back to
the Districts for action, but in some cases – particularly
those of a criminal nature – they are immediately for-
warded to national level organisations such as the State
House’s Health Monitoring Unit. Each report requires
action centres to indicate what response was taken via
the mTrac dashboard. During 2014/15, a total of 9214
SMS texts were received over the hotline, with some
40% of these designated as “actionable”. Of those ad-
dressed at the district level, some 64% were successfully
resolved within a two-week period, while the Health
Monitoring Unit took action on 93% of more serious
complaints. This included the recovery of over 60 mil-
lion Ugandan Schillings (around US$8000) worth of
medicines stolen from Mulago National Hospital and
the prosecution of numerous cases of extortion and neg-
ligence (some of which led to preventable maternal and
neo-natal deaths).
From its initial implementation, the need for mTrac to
become fully integrated into the overall government
health information system (HIS) has always been a prio-
rity. This began with designing the system using existing
MoH HMIS reporting forms. A crucial next step was
integration with DHIS2, which is used by all Districts in
Uganda. The initial version of this web-based, open
source software was developed in South Africa in 1996,
with support from the University of Oslo, and gradually
implemented in all health districts in South Africa coun-
try by 2001 [53]. Details of this challenging process are
provided in Braa and Hedberg [54]. The software is cur-
rently in use in 47 countries, with further development
being undertaken in Vietnam, India, Tanzania, Norway,
Ireland and the United States. It is supported by
NORAD, the Research Council of Norway, PEPFAR and
The Global Fund [55]. It was customised to align with the
reporting requirements of the MoH in Uganda by the
University of Oslo and identified as the only approved
national HMIS system in January 2011. Following an ini-
tial pilot, it was scaled up to all 112 districts by July 2012.
An evaluation by Kibaru et al. [56] found dramatic im-
provements in routine reporting, with completeness in-
creasing from 36% to 85% for monthly outpatient reports
and 21% to 56% for inpatient reports by 2012/13. Similar
gains were seen in terms of timeliness of reporting.
As part of the MoH’s push towards a fully interoperable
national HIS, UNICEF and the University of Oslo has
created a centralized Health Facility Registry, using emer-
ging standards, application protocol interfaces (API’s) and
best practices coming out of the global OpenHIE commu-
nity. A similar process is underway to establish a centra-
lized Health Care Provider registry, with support from
Jembi Health Systems, a South African NGO [57]. To em-
phasise the aim of full integration of mTrac and DHIS2,
in 2015 the MoH rebranded these tools as the “electronic
Health Management Information System” (eHMIS), and
integrated the technical working groups. The MoH’s next
goal is to move services to the patient and community
level, and introduce electronic medical records, which
they aim to scale up by 2020.
Challenges
As might be expected, there have been issues relating to
infrastructure issues in a number of districts. These re-
late to both failures in the electricity supply and limited
internet bandwidth, which hamper the work of the
DHTs. Kiberu et al. [56] also note that the MoH itself
was routinely subject to electricity black-outs, which
hindered access to the central server. While it appears
that mTrac has made routine reporting more efficient,
and as a result more attractive, to health workers [48],
the data still needs to be compiled from the various
source documents. Additionally, private sector facilities
have performed significantly below the national average,
as there is little motivation or leverage to compel timely
reporting. Furthermore, while many Districts are avid
consumers of the data – as seen by Districts such as
Yumbe that are now reporting close to zero preventable
intra-district drug stock-outs, there remain significant
gaps in data utilization and accountability for response
across the country. UNICEF, with partners, is prioritiz-
ing support to the government around this issue in 2016
through a national score card accountability strategy.
Given that the initiative is still at a relatively early stage,
it will be interesting to assess if the enthusiasm of MoH,
District health staff, and health workers can be main-
tained, or if the training and encouragement provided at
this early stage, a substantial proportion of the start-up
costs, will need to be reinforced on a regular basis or
additional incentives devised.
mTrac was built around existing MoH reporting for-
mats and, in line with a national eHealth policy, has
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recently been formally absorbed into the eHMIS
programme. It is now required to synchronise facility
data with DHIS2, health care provider data with iHRIS
(a database used to capture data about health worker
training, deployment, registration and licensure), and
routinely feed data into DHIS2 for analysis. The need to
manage multiple systems, and overcome issues arising
from potentially worthwhile upgrades that might break
compatibility with existing systems, has been challen-
ging. Each modification to a national HMIS necessarily
involves a substantial new round of training and the dis-
tribution of training and operational materials. Typically
this has resulted in a temporary reduction in the quan-
tity and quality of submitted reports. Table 1 shows the
impact of changes introduced in the first quarter of
financial year 2015/16.
This reflects a more general problem that most minis-
tries are not equipped with the institutional or individual
expertise required to undertake what has become a very
substantial programme of work. To address this issue,
those promoting the eHMIS have successfully advocated
for a restructuring of a major unit at the MoH into a
Division of Health Information, which will include
proper staffing with appropriate skills.
One well known effect of improving health informa-
tion systems is a rise in the reported incidence of
common diseases, as was described above in the case
of TB in China. This also seems to have been one
outcome of accessing more reliable and disaggregated
data, as well as providing a simple means for commu-
nity members to report on concerns relating to health
services. The Health Monitoring Unit [58] notes a
steady increase in complaints over time. While many
relate to issues, for example drug stock-outs, that can
be relatively easily resolved, report categories include
‘Theft, Forgery, Extortion and Harassment’, which sug-
gest that resolution may require extensive investiga-
tion and possibly negotiation with local staff or
communities, creating additional workload on local
and national officials. This is critical because, as with
all such systems, it will only continue to be used over
the long run if it is perceived that complaints are
dealt with in an effective, timely manner.
Discussion
Interoperability has been identified as the key to maxi-
mising the healthcare benefits of recent development in
ICTs [59, 60]. However, while there is general agreement
that each component of an HMIS should ideally aim to
allow data exchange with all other components, the
transaction costs associated with this goal, particularly in
terms of the time required for implementation, should
not be underestimated [61]. Those who implement
eHealth innovations are typically convinced of the po-
tential value of those innovations and reluctant to delay
their implementation in order to meet what they may
see as the unreasonable reluctance of other stakeholders
to accept new ways of working. On the other hand those
stakeholders may have substantial investments in terms
of expertise and experience in using the existing systems
and feel justified in demanding substantial evidence of
the potential net benefits of the proposed innovation be-
fore they are willing to accept it. The difficult and pro-
longed negotiations involved in the introduction of the
original version of the DHIS in South Africa provides a
very interesting example of this process [54, 62].
In the above examples, alternative strategies have been
adopted. For those implementing mTrac, conformity with
existing MoH reporting systems was seen as essential
from the outset in order to win the support of key public
sector stakeholders. Improvement of those systems could
be delayed until mTrac was firmly established. In China,
the existing systems were seen to have proved not fit for
purpose, requiring that reform took priority over inter-
operability. It would seem that the process of achieving
this second goal is proving a prolonged and difficult task.
In both countries, data quality is dependent on the
ability and willingness both of those managing the new
systems and those designated as the providers of pri-
mary data. The limited expertise available at ministerial
level in Uganda has been mentioned above. At a grass
roots facility level even the basic skills required to pro-
vide data may in some cases be lacking. A recent study
of staff at this level in South Africa, which has been
using DHIS2 since 1999, reports that “findings suggest
that 64% of the respondents have poor numerical skills
and limited statistical and data quality checking skills
… only 22% actually displayed competence above 50%.
Personnel appear to be reasonably motivated but there
is considerable deficiency in their competency to inter-
pret and use data” [63] (p789). This would suggest that
training and supervision of those entering data will be
key determinants of the quality of any surveillance sys-
tem, a similar finding to that from a recent systematic
review [64]. However, it seems probable that the status
accorded to the activities of these individuals by the
institution within which they work may strongly in-
fluence the level of support provided.
Table 1 Reporting rates for 112 districts for financial year 2015/16
Reporting
Rate
No. of Districts
Q1 Q2 Q3
100 4 18 24
80–99 16 37 59
79–50 53 45 26
<50 39 12 3
Source: Uganda Ministry of Health. eHMIS Annual Donor Report 2016
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In China, the main issue appears to be the lack of en-
gagement by facility staff with the IDRIMS and TBIMS.
As indicated above, facilities which have a high degree of
autonomy have typically implemented information sys-
tems designed primarily to meet their internal needs,
while allowing them to satisfy the limited reporting re-
quirements of government and insurance agencies. Even
the legal requirement for facilities to provide data on pa-
tients diagnosed with a notifiable disease does not seem to
provide a sufficient incentive, probably because there is lit-
tle possibility that they will be penalised if they fail to
comply. Given that financial incentives appear to be the
primary influence on provider behaviour and that reim-
bursement of fees by insurance schemes constitutes a
major component of facility income, one possible way for-
ward might be to make reimbursement for a patient with
a notifiable disease contingent on the insurance agency
being able to locate that patient on the relevant database.
Those involved in the Uganda exercise are very aware
that while greater transparency and accountability
through increased access to reliable data may be widely
regarded as an important driver of improvements in
health services, they can also be perceived as very
threatening by some key stakeholders. To take an ex-
treme example, the anonymous reporting system which
was introduced as part of mTrac, combined with im-
proved logistical and financial data, is exposing corrupt
behaviour, sometimes at a level that may seriously com-
promise service delivery, for example through the mis-
appropriation of essential drugs. In China, where
facilities have typically been encouraged to act in a
manner similar to that of private enterprises in a free
market, with an emphasis on self-reliance and at least
to some extent a competitive attitude to other pro-
viders, the potential for greater scrutiny by outside
agencies, possibly with the potential for increased or
more effective regulation, will almost inevitably be seen
as presenting a substantial risk to their current status.
More generally, improved access to timely data by
agencies that have the incentive and capacity to ana-
lyse that data will almost certainly expose long stand-
ing examples of poor practice and inefficiency. Even
the most honest and committed providers, managers
and administrators may reasonably feel threatened if
they perceive that new information systems may be
used to allocate blame rather than to seek new ways
of working that improve their situation. This requires
a careful process of change management, addressing
the concerns of stakeholders where possible, identify-
ing champions who can explain the potential benefits
and address the perceived risks of new approaches to
their colleagues, and, especially in areas of account-
ability, working incrementally rather than demanding
radical reforms.
Finally, in both examples, it is clear that the key to
driving up data quality is the utilisation of the data by
the various stakeholders [65]. In Uganda, it has become
clear that those districts with over 90% reporting rates
are actively using the data to improve health outcomes,
while in others low reporting rates are reflected in the
limited role which the data play in operational activities.
In many of these district, for example, drug stock-outs
are common even though the information required to
take effective action is available. In China, the IDRIMS
and related TBIMS are actively used by the CDC in ad-
vancing their work on disease surveillance and preven-
tion and they therefore make great efforts to ensure the
reliability of the data collected. However, that data ap-
pears to remain largely irrelevant to the activities of the
facilities from which it is gathered, who have therefore
shown limited interest in plans for integration with the
hospital information systems.
Conclusions
Both examples, stress the importance of recognising the
political, social and historical context within which infor-
mation systems have to function. Implementers need to
focus as much on the perceptions, attitudes and needs of
stakeholders as on the technology. It may also be useful to
distinguish between factors which may influence engage-
ment at an institutional level, for example linking
provision of resources to quality data delivery and empha-
sising a ‘lesson-learning’ rather than a ‘blame-allocation’
ethos, and those aimed at supporting and supervising
individuals within those institutions. Finally, we would
suggest that designing interoperability into systems at the
outset, rather than assuming that this can be achieved at
some point in the future, may prove far easier in the
longer term.
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